This paper investigates the quality of the investment choices that sponsors of defined contribution plans offer to plan participants. Using a unique database comprising more than 30,000 plans over the period from January 2000 to June 2007, we calculate the riskadjusted performance of the equity-oriented investment options that were included in the plans compared to a sample of investment funds that were not. We find that plan options produce alphas that exceed those of non-plan options by an average of 125 basis points per year, an outcome that is relatively insensitive to the factor model specification. This performance advantage is almost wholly due to the actively managed investment options offered by plan sponsors; plan index funds actually underperform non-plan passive investments. Among actively managed plan options, public mutual funds enjoyed a slight performance advantage relative to privately managed institutional funds. We conclude that defined contribution plan sponsors do appear to possess superior selection skills when designing the set of investment options they offer to plan participants.
Introduction
One of the more notable trends to emerge in the management of retirement assets over the past two decades is the rapid ascent of defined contribution plans as one of the primary vehicles by which savings are accumulated. Given their popularity as an investment alternative, it is not surprising that defined contribution plans have begun to receive considerable scrutiny from researchers. To date, the vast majority of this literature appears to be concerned with the way that plan participants choose the funds in which they invest as well as with the subsequent investment performance of those funds. Several stylized facts summarize these findings, much of which has concentrated on 401(k) plans. First, investors are typically either under-or over-allocated toward equity in their asset allocation decision and tend to trade or rebalance their portfolios on an infrequent basis (Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003) ). Second, when offered the choice, 401(k) participants also tend to invest too heavily in the stock of the company sponsoring the plan, which Huberman (2001) calls the "familiarity breeds investment" effect. Finally, Huberman and Jiang (2006) document that plan participants tend to allocate their contributions evenly across the funds they select-the so-called "1/n" strategy-an investment decision that can be justified on a both an analytical (DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2007) ) and behavioral (Benartzi and Thaler (2001) ) basis. 1 On the other hand, far less is known about the motivations and decision-making abilities of the institutions that sponsor defined contribution plans. This is somewhat puzzling given Elton, Gruber, and Blake's (2006) observation that the investment choices made by participants in these plans are themselves a function of the fund choices offered by the plan sponsors. Indeed, in their study focusing on the 401(k) market, the authors concluded that just over half of the plans they examined offered an adequate set of mutual fund choices, which they defined as one capable of spanning the space delineated by eight asset-and style-class indexes. Further, it is not clear that the choices that 401(k) sponsors do offer to investors are superior to those that they do not. Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2007) also looked at the risk-adjusted performance of the mutual funds selected by a small sample (i.e., 43) of plan sponsors over the period from 1994 to 1999 and concluded that these administrators do possess some selection skills. Specifically, they found that the funds offered to plan participants outperformed a randomly selected set of style-matched funds, despite producing negative alphas relative to the passive benchmark portfolios.
2 By contrast, in a related study from the defined benefit plan literature, Goyal and Wahal (2007) demonstrated that the decisions made by plan sponsors when hiring or firing active portfolio managers did not subsequently lead to superior performance.
Further, Cohen and Schmidt (2007) have suggested that mutual fund companies appear to overweight the stock of plan sponsor companies in their family of portfolios in order to attract potential defined contribution business, a policy that could erode the overall performance to their non-plan investors.
Although the preceding findings are suggestive, they nevertheless offer an incomplete picture of the design and investment performance offered to participants in a defined contribution plan. In particular, a substantial amount of assets in these plans are not invested in publicly traded mutual funds. For instance, the Investment Company Institute (2007) reported that in 2006 only 54.0% of plan assets were held in mutual funds, with
the majority of what remained invested in privately managed institutional portfolios or the sponsoring company's own stock. As a consequence, it is difficult to judge the quality of the investment choices the sponsors provide to participants without examining the performance of these privately managed alternatives. Additionally, given the legal mandate that sponsors face to provide a diversified collection of alternatives to participants in the plans, it is likely that both the selection and composition of the active and passive management options differs from that found in a less restrictive environment (see, for instance, Harlow and Brown (2006) ). 3 In fact, the additional explicit and implicit constraints faced by sponsors with regard to the choices they offer represent a contracting challenge that can potentially have a material impact on investment performance, along the lines of Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) .
In this paper, we extend the literature on the role played by the plan sponsor in the investment performance of a defined contribution plan. Our investigation is based on a unique dataset maintained by the largest plan administrator in the industry and consists of the investment options offered by more than 27,000 sponsors of over 30,000 plans during the period from January 2000 to June 2007. These investment options are delineated along several lines (e.g., equity vs. fixed-income, passive vs. active management, private vs. public fund) that permit a number of new questions to be addressed. To facilitate this analysis, we also develop a sample of otherwise comparable investment vehicles that sponsors chose not to select as plan options. The investment returns generated by these non-plan options serve as an indirect assessment of the opportunity cost of the sponsors' selection skills inasmuch as they proxy for the next-best collection of options that could have been offered to plan participants. Thus, in addition to examining the overall level of plan performance relative to expectations, this methodological design also allows us to assess the ability of plan sponsors to create a superior menu of plan options from which the participants' retirement investment decisions are made.
Focusing on the equity-oriented funds that were either included or not included in a defined contribution plan, we develop and test four different hypotheses regarding the 3 Many of the legal restrictions imposed on the plan sponsor in its role as a fiduciary are discussed in more detail in the next section.
selection skills of plan sponsors. First, we posit that the investment options that sponsors offer to plan participants produce superior risk-adjusted returns relative to those options that are not selected for the plan. Second, we consider the possibility that it is the set of actively managed (i.e., non-index fund) options that determine any measurable performance differential between plan and non-plan options. Third, as a complement to the previous conjecture, we argue that passively managed plan options may outperform passively managed non-plan options. Finally, within the set of plan options, we examine whether privately managed funds outperform public mutual funds on a risk-adjusted basis, perhaps due to differences in the investment restrictions faced by private and public managers.
To control for the possibility of model and time period misspecification, we calculate risk-adjusted performance statistics (i.e., alphas) for our plan and non-plan investment option samples using three different variations of a multi-factor risk model and over three different subperiods of the entire 90-month sample period. Our findings, which remain invariant to the myriad modeling adjustments, indicate that, on average, plan options significantly outperform non-plan options after controlling for risk. The mean alpha differential over the entire sample period was about 11 basis points per month, which annualizes to more than 125 basis points per annum, net of fees. Further, it is the set of actively managed investment funds that is almost exclusively responsible for this performance differential; the difference in plan and non-plan alphas was especially strong (i.e., about 20 basis points per month) during the weak equity market of 2000-2002. On the other hand, non-plan index funds produce slightly larger alphas than passively managed plan funds, particularly in the earliest sample subperiod. Finally, among the collection of actively managed products offered within the plan sample, there appears to be little difference in risk-adjusted performance between privately and publicly managed funds when the averages are computed on an equally weighted basis. However, when these alpha measures are calculated on a participant-or plan asset-weighted basis, there is a slight tendency for public mutual funds to produce superior returns relative to private institutional accounts. On the basis of the strength and consistency of these findings, we conclude that the sponsors of defined contribution plans possess legitimate selections skills that allow them to discriminate between potential investment options in a meaningful way.
The remainder paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss how a typical defined contribution plan is organized in terms of the number of investment alternatives offered to participants and provide descriptive statistics on how the industry has evolved in recent years. In Section 3, we describe the data we use in the empirical analysis, while in the fourth and fifth sections we develop and test the hypotheses regarding plan sponsor behavior. Section 6 concludes the study.
Defined Contribution Plan Organization and the Plan Sponsor's Decision
As provided for by the United States Congress in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 and modified by the Tax Reform Act of 1978, defined contribution retirement plans represent multi-faceted arrangements between at least four economic agents: the plan participant, the plan sponsor, the plan administrator/service provider, and the plan investment managers. In a typical plan, a portion of an employee's (i.e., the plan participant) salary is deducted on a pre-tax basis by the employer (i.e., the plan sponsor) and earmarked for investment in the plan. Depending on the specific nature of the plan, these deductions are usually made on a voluntary basis by the participant and may be matched by additional contributions from the sponsor. These funds are then turned over to a third-party (i.e., the plan administrator/service provider), who provides an array of services to both the participant and the sponsor. The most important of these services are (i) the investment of the earmarked funds in a pre-selected set of alternative investment vehicles (i.e., the plan investment managers), (ii) the administration (e.g., record-keeping, statement creation, check processing) of the plan for the sponsor on behalf of the participant, and (iii) assisting the sponsor in providing financial information and investment guidance to the participant.
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A critical aspect of this network of relationships is that the plan participant is ultimately responsible for deciding how the plan assets are to be invested. In fact, shifting the risk of the investment outcome to the participant is perhaps the main reason why the defined contribution form of retirement investing has become popular among plan sponsors. Still, as a plan fiduciary, the sponsor is legally responsible for providing the participant with assistance on making prudent investment decisions. 5 This assistance can fall under the heading of general education about the asset allocation process or specific advice on which investment alternatives to select. Because of the additional potential liability involved, plan sponsors usually avoid offering specific advice, opting instead to provide more general educational information centered on the importance of the saving function and risk tolerance decision. In this setting, giving specific investment advice to participants for whom general education is insufficient falls to outside financial advisors, who then also become fiduciaries within the plan.
Beyond these educational services, the most important decision the plan sponsor faces as the named fiduciary is the selection of investment vehicles comprising the set of investment choices for participants in the plan. Unfortunately, plan sponsors-which are typically not companies directly involved in the financial services business-are given very little legal guidance as to how this set of choices should be designed, in terms of either the number or identity of the alternatives. ERISA Section 404(c) generally requires the sponsor to diversify plan choices by offering "…a participant or beneficiary an opportunity to choose, from a broad range of investment alternatives, the manner in which some or all of the assets in his account are invested (p. 490)." Over time, this requirement has come to be interpreted as an obligation to provide at least three investment choices that are (i) diversified and have materially different risk-return characteristics, and (ii) allow the participant to create an appropriate range of risk-return outcomes when used in combination with one another. In practice, this interpretation 5 Formally, a fiduciary in this context is any entity that has control over the management of an employee benefit plan or its assets, a designation which includes anyone who offers investment advice regarding plan assets for a fee. Usually, the set of fiduciary agents in a plan include, at a minimum, the sponsor (i.e., the named fiduciary) and the administrator, although there is no limit as to how many other agents might also satisfy the definition. Under ERISA, all actions taken by a fiduciary must be for the exclusive benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries and fiduciaries must exercise the care, skill, and diligence that would be used by a reasonably prudent person familiar with such matters. See McGill, Brown, Haley, and Schieber (2005) for a more detailed discussion of both the responsibilities of fiduciaries and the rights of participants in the pension plan market.
suggests that equities, fixed-income, and cash equivalents be the three asset classes included in the minimum set of alternatives.
Designing a defined contribution plan that simultaneously satisfies the fiduciary obligations of the sponsor while meeting the needs of the participants and controlling expenses is obviously a challenging task. For this reason, sponsors quite frequently engage an outside administrator/service provider to assist with this process, along with consultants that have no direct control over the management or administration of the assets. Drawn from a wide spectrum of the investment management industry (e.g., Fidelity Investments, AIG Valic, Charles Schwab, ING, Merrill Lynch, Nationwide
Financial, SunTrust Bank, T. Rowe Price Group), these service providers are typically better equipped to assist the sponsor in creating a menu of investment alternatives that will address the range of financial situations faced by participants in the plan. Depending on the scope of the service provider's operations, the portfolios defining these investment choices can be managed by its internal staff, by external managers and sub-advisors, or by some combination of the two. While the gamut of design features that fall within the plan administrator's influence is subject to negotiation with the sponsor, it often includes the number of plan investment choices, the asset classes covered by the choices, the specific investment vehicles representing the designated asset classes, and whether those investment vehicles are available from public (i.e., mutual fund) or private account managers. Thus, chief among the criteria a plan sponsor will use to judge the performance of a service provider is the investment performance of the plan alternatives it helped to select relative to those it did not.
A recent survey of plan sponsors and service providers conducted by Plansponsor magazine reveals several interesting aspects of the organizational structure of the defined contribution industry. 6 For the almost 5,000 defined contribution plan sponsors surveyed, roughly two-thirds of the plans (62.1%) had fewer than 500 participants and, on average, 70.1% of the eligible employees choose to participate. The plans also tended to be small in scale; 70.2% of them had fewer than $50 million in total assets under management. 
Data Description

Plan Administrator Data Sample
The primary source of information used in this study comes from the proprietary database of defined contribution plans maintained by Fidelity Investments, the largest work-place pension plan administrator and service provider in the world. The data consists of the relevant characteristics describing all of the defined contribution plans for which the company served as record-keeper for the period from January 2000 to June 2007. In particular, for each plan, we obtained the following records: (i) the number of participants involved, (ii) the total assets under management, (iii) the total number, identities, and investment attributes (e.g., public vs. private fund, equity vs. fixed-income) of the investment options held by participants, and (iv) monthly returns to all of the available investment options. Table I summarizes several of the salient characteristics of the defined contribution plan sample. In Panel A, we list statistics regarding the number of sponsors, plans, participants, and assets under management in the sample, as well as the distribution of available plan options offered by the sponsors. By any measure, the sample is a large one, comprising over 27,000 plan sponsors, over 30,000 plans, 12.5 million participants, and total assets of almost $900 billion. 7 Further, the size of the plans in terms of both the average number of participants per plan and the average assets under management per plan increased over the sample period, allowing for the equity market downturn that ended in 2002. Of more importance in the present context, however, is the fact that sponsors appear to offer plan participants a sizeable number of investment options.
Across the entire sample, there were 635,215 total options (i.e., the sum of the number of investment alternatives across all plans) offered by the last reporting date, which corresponds to an average of 23.22 options per plan. Notice also that the mean number of options per plan increased steadily during the sample period from a starting point of fewer than 15 products. Finally, the reported ranges of the minimum (one) and maximum (696) number of investment options that were actually held by participants within a plan suggest that there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity within the sample.
Panel B of Table I provides a more detailed breakdown on the nature of the plan options that sponsors offer. Percentage allocation statistics are listed for three main divisions of the plan option sample according to (i) asset classes, (ii) whether the plan option was managed privately in an institutional account or in a public mutual fund, and (iii) whether the plan option followed a passive or active investment mandate. Further, these allocation percentages are tabulated by (i) the number of plan options available, (ii) the percentage of plan participants selecting that option type, and (iii) the percentage of total plan assets held in that option type. For instance, 58.93% of plan options in the sample are U.S. Domestic equity funds, which represented 65.82% of the investment positions held by the average plan participant and 65.19% of the total assets invested across the plan sample. There are three things of particular note about these statistics.
First, domestic equity represents the dominant asset class, easily exceeding the combined allocations to the other alternatives. Second, while there is a significant representation of both privately and publicly managed funds in the plan option sample, the latter appear to be the dominant choice of participants as an investment vehicle by a ratio of about nine to one (e.g., 77.14% to 8.64%). Finally, the vast majority of plan assets offered and invested in fall within the active management classification, but a larger proportion of privately managed funds are passively managed.
Non-Plan Investment Options Sample
In order to compare the quality of the plan option decisions made by our sponsor sample,
we also constructed a sample of non-plan options. That is, at the beginning of each calendar year in the sample, we constructed a representative collection of investment alternatives that sponsors could have included in their plans, but choose not to. Since we did not have access to information concerning all of the private management options that sponsors may have considered before rejecting them, our non-plan option sample consists exclusively of publicly available mutual funds that were not included in any of the defined contribution plans for which Fidelity Investments served as a fiduciary during the sample period. Further, to help manage the scope of the analysis, we only considered mutual funds with a U.S. equity-oriented objective.
To accomplish these objectives, on January 1 of each sample year, we screened the database maintained by Morningstar, Inc., an independent provider of investment research services, for all domestic equity funds that were available for purchase by retail customers. To insure that each potential non-plan fund truly followed an equity investment mandate, we imposed the additional inclusion criteria that it produced a coefficient of determination of at least 75% when its returns were evaluated by a multirisk factor model. (The various forms of this return-generating model are described in the next section.) We then isolated those funds that did not also appear on the list of plan options available in the sponsor sample. Only those funds that never appeared on the Fidelity plan option list during a given performance measurement period were included in the final non-plan option sample. 8 Morningstar also provided monthly returns for these funds, along with various other data concerning the funds' investment characteristics (e.g., objective, style class).
The Quality of Plan Option Selections: Testable Hypotheses and Methodology
Testable Hypotheses
The underlying motivation for this study is to investigate formally the quality of the investment options that sponsors offer to participants in defined contribution plans.
Specifically, we propose to analyze whether the choices that sponsors select are superior to those that they do not. The literature provides evidence on both sides of this question.
On one hand, Parwada and Faff (2005) studied investment management mandates in the pension market and found that those mandates were substantially more likely to be awarded to managers exhibiting superior past performance relative to their peers. Thus, given the tendency for asset manager performance to persist (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Brown and Goetzmann (1995) ), it is reasonable to expect that the options provided to plan participants represent a superior set of investment choices. On the other hand, Goyal and Wahal (2007) showed that plan sponsors that follow a "return chasing" strategy of hiring (terminating) investment managers following periods of abnormally good (poor) performance do not deliver superior excess returns subsequently.
Additionally, Carhart (1997) showed that apparent persistence in mutual fund performance is likely to be an artifact of a misspecified model of return expectations.
Accordingly, this debate frames the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The investment options that defined contribution plan sponsors offer to participants produce superior risk-adjusted returns relative to those options that are not selected for the plan.
As described in the previous section, plan sponsors offer participants options that are managed on both a passive (i.e., indexed) and active basis. While the we do not address the "passive vs. active" management debate directly-see, for instance, Bogle (1998)-it is relevant to consider whether the actively managed options offered in a plan have superior investment characteristics to those active funds the sponsor did not select. Since there is substantial evidence that active fund managers possess genuine skills (e.g., Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) , Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler (2007) ), the question becomes whether plan sponsors are able to identify and select those skillful managers (and avoid those that are not) when creating the menu of plan options.
Similarly, although both the nature of the investment problem and the tighter fee structures make it less likely that indexed products will exhibit significant differences from one another (e.g., Guedj and Huang (2007)), it is nevertheless interesting to consider whether passively managed plan options outperform comparable non-plan ones.
Thus, two additional hypotheses that we test are:
Hypothesis 2: The actively managed investment options that plan sponsors offer to participants produce superior risk-adjusted returns relative to those actively managed options that are not selected for the plan.
Hypothesis 3:
The passively managed investment options that plan sponsors offer to participants produce superior risk-adjusted returns relative to those passively managed options that are not selected for the plan.
Finally, the statistics presented in Table I also indicated that a number of the options that plan sponsors offer are managed in private investment vehicles as opposed to publicly available funds. Although there is limited extant evidence on the topic, studies such as Coggin, Fabozzi, and Rahman (1993) and Christopherson, Ferson, and Glassman (1998) provide mixed evidence on whether private pension managers are able to produce superior investment performance. Further, it is possible that private managers face a markedly different set of investment restrictions than those imposed on managers in the public fund market and that these differences could affect investment performance (e.g., Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) ). This discrepancy leads to the following prediction:
Hypothesis 4: The privately managed investment options that plan sponsors offer to participants produce superior risk-adjusted returns relative to otherwise comparable publicly managed options.
Measuring Abnormal Investment Performance
To compare the relative investment performance for our samples of plan and non-plan options, we estimate several versions of the following four-factor risk model adapted from Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) :
where, for each month t, (R jt -RF t ) and (R mt -RF t ) are the excess returns to the j-th investment option and the market portfolio, respectively; SMB is the difference in returns between portfolios of small and large capitalization firms; HML is the difference in returns between portfolios of stocks with the highest and lowest book-to-market ratios;
and MOM is the difference between the returns to portfolios of stocks with the largest and smallest returns during the previous 11 months (see Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) for the motivation for including price momentum effects). 9 Specifically, within a given time horizon, we estimate three different α (i.e., alpha) coefficients for each investment alternative using: (i) a one-factor version of (1) with (R mt -RF t ) as the independent variable; (ii) a three-factor version with (R mt -RF t ), SMB, and HML; and (iii) the full fourfactor version of (1).
The primary tests for the hypotheses detailed in the preceding section are based on risk-adjusted performance statistics calculated over the full 90-month sample period from January 2000-June 2007. However, as the descriptive information summarized in Table I showed, the defined contribution pension industry grew substantially during this time Finally, we also imposed two additional conditions on the empirical analysis. First, given the nature of the risk model and the non-plan option sample we employ, we only calculated alphas for those plan options following a domestic equity mandate. Thus, we do not address in the study the quality of the fixed-income or cash-equivalent options that plan sponsors chose. Second, in order to generate equivalent sample sizes for each of the three forms of the risk factor models used to calculate alphas, the R 2 inclusion rule described earlier for building the non-plan option comparison sample was based on the three-factor version of (1) only. 
Full Sample Results
In assessing the quality of the plan options that sponsors offer to their defined contribution plan participants, there are two questions that need to be addressed. First, does the total set of potential plan options from which sponsors make their selections produce returns that meet or exceed expectations? Second, do the funds that sponsors actually include in their plans outperform funds that were not selected? While answering the second question is the primary focus of this investigation, it is also interesting to consider whether plan participants are being well served on an absolute basis as well as a relative one, allowing for plan fees. Table II 10 We have also produced a full set of the findings discussed in the next section using the three different non-plan option samples that result from applying the "R 2 > 0.75" inclusion rule independently to each of the three versions of (1). Although this procedure generated slightly different non-plan sample sizes, it had no appreciable impact on the reported outcomes; these findings are available upon request. 11 The mean alpha differential test was conducted as a standard difference-in-means t-test, adjusting for the unequal sizes of the plan and non-plan subsamples. The median alpha differential tests were conducted using the Mann-Whitney procedure. The (% Pos. Alpha) differential test was conducted as a chi-squared test on the difference in proportions in two samples.
Mean Difference Tests
The mean alpha statistics for the total sample of potential plan options shown in Panel A suggest that factor model selection does appear to matter. In particular, there is a sizeable gap between the average monthly alphas generated by the one-factor market model (i.e., -2.86 basis points) and the three-and four-factors versions of the FamaFrench model (i.e., -11.07 and -10.47 basis points, respectively). Comparable gaps exist for the other two alpha summary statistics, suggesting that the one-factor risk model may be setting return expectations too low relative to the true level of risk that exists within the set of equity funds from which plan sponsors could choose. Regardless of the model specification, however, notice that both the mean and median alpha statistics are negative and that the proportion of potential plans producing a positive alpha never exceeds 40%.
This implies that the overall set of possible plan options generated returns that fell short of expectations, but it is interesting to note that the level of annualized shortfall is within the range of the funds' expense ratios, which the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration (1998) showed could range as high as 133 basis points per year for defined contribution plan options. Further, these findings are also consistent with the percentage of all retail mutual funds that are capable of producing positive alphas relative a multi-factor risk model (see Harlow and Brown (2006) ).
Beyond issues concerning the quality of the potential investable universe, the more relevant issue involves examining the difference in the alphas generated by the set of alternatives that sponsors chose compared to those they did not. In this regard, the evidence in Panel A appears to be quite persuasive. For each factor model, plan sponsors consistently selected funds that produced, on average, the largest risk-adjusted returns.
For example, using the three-factor model to describe return expectations, the mean monthly alpha for the set of plan options was 10.58 basis points higher than that for the non-plan sample, which translates into an annual advantage of more than 1.25%. This outcome was confirmed by the other factor model variations-particularly the four-factor model that allows for return momentum effects-and, to a modestly reduced extent, by the median alpha differential statistics. Additionally, the significant difference in the (% Pos. Alpha) measure (e.g., 44.72% vs. 33.71% for the three-factor model) indicates that this mean alpha advantage is not being driven by a few outliers. Consequently, these data represent an initial indication that plan sponsors may possess selection skills that allow them to discriminate among the best set of available investment options.
The subperiod breakdown shown in Panel B of Table II produces a similar picture. In all three 30-month intervals, the plan option sample outperforms the non-plan sample on a risk-adjusted basis irrespective of which metric is used. This performance advantage is particularly strong during the general equity market decline that occurred in the first subperiod (i.e., January 2000-June 2002), which suggests that plan sponsors may be especially good at selecting funds that control downside risk on a relative basis. This notion is corroborated by the fact that more than three out five of the plan options during this period beat expectations, whereas fewer than 50% of the non-plan funds were able to do the same. However, given that the mean and median alpha differentials were significantly positive in the other subperiods, it also appears that sponsors were capable of selecting funds that outperformed in rising markets as well. Collectively, then, these findings provide considerable support for our first hypothesis.
Factor-Matching Tests
While the difference tests in Table II summarize several aspects of how the typical plan and non-plan funds performed over the sample period, there may be important crosssectional differences in these samples that are "averaged out" by the methodological design. For instance, despite the fact that all of the plan and non-plan returns were riskadjusted using the same multi-factor model, there is a chance that the two samples load differently on the various risk factors. If this is indeed the case, any imprecision in measuring either the factor betas for a particular investment option or the overall levels of the factors themselves could manifest as an unintended difference in the reported alphas.
To guard against this possibility, we compared the performance of the plan and nonplan samples using a more precise method of matching investment options by their factor exposures. Specifically, within each sample division, we placed every investment option into one of 16 unique factor-matched bins according to whether its beta exposures from the four-factor version of (1) fell above or below the median value for the entire sample.
For example, an option included in a plan having an above-median (R m -RF) beta, belowmedian SMB beta, below-median HML beta, and above-median MOM beta would be placed in the [High (R m -RF), Low SMB, Low HML, High MOM] factor-matched bin within the plan option sample.
12 After filling each bin in this manner for both investment option types, we then calculated the bin-specific mean alpha, median alpha, and (% Pos.
Alpha) performance statistics, as well as the differences in those respective values across the plan and non-plan samples. For the purpose of this sorting procedure, factor betas and alphas were measured over the entire 90-month sample period. Table III lists the frequencies and risk-adjusted performance differentials for each of the sixteen factor-match bins. Notice that the plan and non-plan options appear to sort in a roughly similar manner. This can be seen in the seventh column of the display, which reports the ratio of the number of plan options to the number of non-plan options that occur in a particular bin. Using the total sample ratio of about 24% (i.e., 2,028 ÷ 8,626)
as the expected frequency in each bin, the chi-square statistic testing for bin uniformity is 15.15, which has an associated p-value of only 0.5139. Nevertheless, the bin frequency range of 14.21% to 31.87% indicates some amount of dispersion in how the extreme observations in these samples are divided. For the four bins with the largest relative concentrations of plan options, three have high SMB exposures, three have low HML exposures, and three have low MOM exposures. However, it is important to point out that broad nature of the sorting routine we employ makes it impossible to infer whether these strategic outcomes were an intentional part of the sponsors' selection process or merely a statistical artifact.
Whether using the mean or median, the alpha difference statistics show a remarkable degree of consistency across the 16 factor-matched bins. In fact, all of the bin-specific differentials for both performance measures are positive, and they are statistically significant at the 5% level in 10 (mean alpha) and 14 (median alpha) cases, respectively.
Further, notice that the respective sample-wide weighted averages for these statistics match the 11 basis point and 9 basis point values reported for their equally weighted counterparts using the four-factor risk model in Table II . Additionally, the next-to-last column of Table III shows that the plan option sample produced a higher percentage of 12 Due to correlation among the factor loadings, it is unlikely that this sorting procedure will ever produce bins of equal size in any given sample. That is, if low-SMB beta options in the non-plan sample also tend to have low MOM factor exposures, the [Low SMB, Low MOM] bins will be more heavily populated than the [High SMB, High MOM] bins. Thus, this sorting method controls for differences that may exist in the factor loading patterns of the plan and non-plan samples.
positive alphas than the non-plan sample in 12 of the 16 bins. Taken together, these factor-matched findings provide strong confirmation for our initial judgment regarding the investment superiority of the plan option sample and allow us to state more confidently that the selection skills demonstrated by plan sponsors are not confined toor driven by-a limited number of factor-related investment strategies.
Active vs. Passive Management Results
To help establish the source of the apparent return differential enjoyed by plan funds, Table IV refines the analysis of the preceding section by focusing on the set of actively managed funds maintained within the total investable option universe. As in Table II of 2,028) samples are actively managed. Thus, it is not surprising that the differences in mean and median alphas generated by active plan and non-plan options are quite similar to those reported for the entire sample. Despite this fact, it does appear to be the case that those differentials are slightly larger in the active sample than for the comparable measures in the total sample. For instance, the mean three-factor alpha differences for the active and total samples were 11.04 and 10.58 basis points, respectively. Further, the ability of plan sponsors to discriminate among funds able to exceed return expectations appears to be greater as well; the difference in the (% Pos. Alpha) statistic between the plan and non-plan options using the three-factor model is 12.79% for active funds versus 11.01% for all funds. This pattern is reflected across all factor model variations, as well as in each of the shorter intervals included in the subperiod analysis shown in Panel B.
Thus, consistent with our second hypothesis, we conclude that the actively managed funds that sponsors select for their plans do outperform the set of non-plan options, after controlling for risk.
It is also possible that the passively managed investment alternatives offered to plan participants outperform those that sponsors considered but rejected. However, the findings reported in Table V The overall inference that can be drawn from the combined results listed in Table IV and Table V is that sponsors do appear to be adept at selecting actively managed funds to offer to participants in their defined contribution plans, but that they show no special skills when choosing among the set of available index fund alternatives. Accordingly, in addition to finding support for our second hypothesis, we also reject our third proposition that the passively managed plan funds produce better risk-adjusted returns than non-plan funds. This is perhaps not an unexpected outcome in that the rewards to the plan participant in terms of potential value added from having sponsors spend their time analyzing active funds rather than passive ones in undoubtedly greater. 13 Based on this evidence, we can therefore narrow our earlier conclusion regarding the superior selection skills of the sponsors in our sample to include just those potential plan options that have an active management mandate.
Public vs. Private Management Results
Given the advantage in risk-adjusted performance documented for the subset of actively managed plan options, it is useful to consider some possible determinants of this result.
One potentially important structural difference that exists within the plan option sample is that some of the funds are managed in private institutional accounts while others are run as public mutual funds. Table VI reports statistics summarizing the alpha differentials between the privately and publicly managed funds that constitute the set of actively managed plan options. For the sake of brevity, the display only lists findings for the entire sample period, but aggregates the risk-adjusted performance statistics in three different ways: (i) equally weighted abnormal returns, (ii) participant-weighted abnormal returns, and (iii) plan asset-weighted abnormal returns.
14 Panel A shows the set of average alpha measures calculated on an equally weighted basis. This calculation method implicitly assigns the same level of importance to each plan option regardless of degree to which participants actually invest in it or the size of the plan in which it is included. Nevertheless, the results indicate little difference in performance between the typical private and public fund. In fact, the three-and fourfactor versions of (1) lead to insignificant average performance differentials of approximately one basis point, with only modest differences in the (% Pos. Alpha)
variable. Further, while the one-factor model produces a marginally significant alpha differential (i.e., p-value of 4.62%), the performance advantage favors the public funds over private managers. Certainly, there is no evidence in Panel A to support the final hypothesis we investigate regarding the superiority of privately managed accounts.
Indeed, if the performance statistics are tabulated on the basis of how the typical plan participant actually allocates within the plan (Panel B) or how the total plan assets are allocated across the entire sample (Panel C), the preponderance of the evidence is consistent with the alternative story that mutual fund managers produce slightly better risk-adjusted returns than private managers. For example, when either multi-factor form of the risk model is employed to calculate alpha, the median performance differential in favor of mutual funds is about seven basis points per month. Further, more than half of the public managers produced positive alphas, while more than half of the private managers failed to do so (e.g., 58.42% positive alphas in mutual funds vs. 42.88% in institutional accounts using the three-factor model in the asset-weighted sample). When compared to the insignificant performance differentials in the equally weighted sample, these findings suggest that plan participants are able to identify the better funds when deciding where they should actually invest their money. Thus, not only do the earlier results indicate that plan sponsors exhibit positive selection skills when choosing their plan option menus, but it may also be the case the investors who use those menus to allocate their retirement savings exhibit positive selection skills of their own.
It is tempting on the basis of the findings in the bottom two panels of Table VI to conclude that the typical manager of a public plan fund possesses somewhat elevated skills relative to the typical private plan fund manager. However, while this might be true, there are at least two reasons that argue against that judgment. First, the statistical evidence is not especially strong; in fact, the alpha differentials from the one-factor model actually contradict that conclusion. 15 Further, even if these performance statistics capture legitimate return differentials, it is possible that they merely reflect disparities in the fee structures between public and private accounts-along the lines of what Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2007) showed for plan and non-plan mutual funds-rather than disparate levels of investment prowess. Although our data do not permit us to differentiate between those two possibilities directly, it is nonetheless true that defined contribution plan participants are likely to be benefited by their strong preference for using public fund managers. 
Concluding Comments
Although the size and scope of the market for retirement assets has fostered a considerable amount of research, much of that literature has been concentrated on the portfolio choices that investors make as well as the investment performance associated with those decisions. Of course, the choices that participants make are a direct function 15 Because the participant-and plan asset-based aggregation methods in Panels B and C represent weighted averages, notice that it is only possible to calculate p-values for the mean alpha difference tests, which have been appropriately adjusted for each weighting scheme. 16 Unfortunately, we also lack sufficient data to ascertain whether our samples of public and private funds face differences in investment policy restrictions that could materially impact investment performance. Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) found that cross-sectional differences in the constraints faced by a collection of mutual funds did not affect risk-adjusted performance, a result they interpreted as being consistent with the existence of an optimal monitoring mechanism at work in the public fund market. Thus, the conclusion that public and private managers produce different alpha levels at least raises the possibility that discrepancies in the restriction sets faced by the two types of managers do impose a measurable impact on returns.
of the set of alternatives they are offered, but far less is known about the motivation and performance of the sponsors who provide those choices. To help address this need, in this paper we posit and test several hypotheses concerning the quality of the investment options that sponsors selected compared to those that they did not. Using a comprehensive database maintained by the largest service provider in the defined contribution industry, we demonstrate that the investment options included in plans outperform an otherwise comparable set of non-plan alternatives by more than 1.25% on an annualized risk-adjusted basis. Further, we show that the sources of this outperformance are the actively managed funds that sponsors select and, to a lesser extent, the public fund products they choose. We conclude that plan sponsors possess genuine selection skills with regard to the menu of investment options they offer to their participants.
Our analysis also suggests some potentially fruitful directions for future research. We have concentrated on the equity fund selections made by plan sponsors, which is likely to be the asset class for which there is the largest possible benefit in deploying superior selection skills. Even so, the same set of hypotheses that we test in this study could be applied to fixed-income, cash-equivalent, or even life-cycle and tactical asset allocation funds. Further, it would be interesting to consider how frequently sponsors feel compelled to adjust the set of available plan options and what the economic and behavioral determinants underlying that decision might be. Beyond that, it is likely that managers in the defined contribution market are subject to the same sort of agency problems of the type identified by Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) . However, inasmuch as all of these issues are well beyond the scope of the present investigation, they will be left for future consideration. (1): (i) a one-factor model using (R m -RF); (ii) a three-factor model using (R m -RF), SMB, and HML; and (iii) a four-factor model using (R m -RF), SMB, HML, and MOM. Statistics indicating the difference in performance between plan and non-plan options and the associated p-values are reported in the last two rows for each sample period. Risk-adjusted performance (i.e., alpha) statistics are reported for the sample of actively managed plan investment options according to whether the fund was (i) privately managed in an institutional account; or (ii) managed in a public fund. Data is reported over the full sample period of January 2000-June 2007. Alphas were calculated relative to three versions of the factor model in (1): (i) a one-factor model using (R m -RF); (ii) a three-factor model using (R m -RF), SMB, and HML; and (iii) a four-factor model using (R m -RF), SMB, HML, and MOM. Summary performance measures were aggregated in three ways: (i) equally weighted (Panel A); (ii) participant-weighted (Panel B); and (iii) plan asset-weighted (Panel C). Statistics indicating the difference in performance between plan and non-plan options and the associated p-values are reported in the last two rows for each sample aggregation method. 
